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This special issue of the Erasmus Law Review is the
result of an interdisciplinary workshop on ‘Company
Tax Integration in the European Union – a Necessary
Step to Neutralise “Excessive” Behaviour within the
EU?’, held at the Erasmus School of Law in June 2013
and organized by the Foundation European Fiscal Stud-
ies in co-operation with Erasmus Law Review.1 A topic
currently attracting considerable public attention, not
least because of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project of the OECD instigated by the G20.
During the past decades there has been intensive tax
competition between EU Member States for attracting
capital triggered inter alia by the four freedoms as laid
down in the European treaties.2 Even though competi-
tion is widely seen as beneficial to society,3 in case of
inter-jurisdictional tax competition this may not always
be the case.4 The possible negative effects of inter-juris-
dictional tax competition and aggressive tax planning by
multinational companies on state’s tax revenue may lead
to a shift of the tax burden onto less mobile activities
and onto consumption in order to keep a state’s public
finances stable. In the end a jurisdiction’s tax system
may become distorted (inefficient) and distribution
unfair. In order to neutralize the negative effects of
harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning,
one might be of the opinion that integrating company
taxes within the EU would be the only way forward.
There are good arguments for and against company tax
integration within the EU. These arguments have
already been discussed intensively from the start of the
EU-project.5 Irrespective of whether one belongs to the
supporters or opponents of company tax integration,
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current practice makes clear that some kind of ‘order’ is
needed to set the rules of the game for inter-jurisdic-
tional tax competition and aggressive tax planning by
multinational companies. But there are very practical
legal problems, too. The sheer number of Member
States as well as the unanimity requirement and pro-
European stance of the EU institutions prevent a step
towards further company tax integration under the EU
umbrella.
If integration is reached under the EU umbrella, anoth-
er question comes up as to the sharing of the tax reve-
nue. The allocation key proposed by the European
Commission under the proposed CCCTB-directive
might be positive for the larger Member States, like
France and Germany, but disadvantageous to the small-
er ones. Besides, the issue might arise whether the reve-
nue should go into the coffers of the European Union
instead of the ones of the Member States. This question
is very topical in the light of the recent sovereign debt
crisis of Member States, when Member States agreed to
implement ‘debt brakes’ into their constitutions.6
This special issue comprises four topical contributions.
1. The contribution by Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca
(both from the University of Göttingen, Germany) is
concerned with a survey of the empirical literature on
inter-jurisdictional tax competition. Thereby they
discuss in depth whether tax competition leads to a
race to the bottom with regard to tax revenue, making
tax integration inevitable. However, the authors can
show empirically that tax revenue in the EU does not
decrease as strong as one might suspect. Therefore,
they suggest that a system of intergovernmental
transfers could be more appropriate for sharing reve-
nue between Member States than preventing tax
competition at all. As a consequence it might be pos-
sible to prevent politicians from exploiting citizens
and firms (tax competition) and having at the same
time sound revenues for the Member States (inter-
governmental transfers).
2. Vrijburg (Erasmus University Rotterdam) devotes
his contribution to the question of whether, from the
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perspective of an economist, supranational coopera-
tion is needed to stop ‘excessive company taxation
practices’ within the EU (encompassing inter-juris-
dictional tax competition and tax-planning activities
by multinational companies). First, he discusses the
main conclusions in the economic literature on this
question. Thereafter, he develops a conceptual
framework to structure the debate on the question
whether excessive company taxation practices harm
welfare. Thereby he asks himself the question wheth-
er government action should be undertaken at all to
remove excessive company taxation. The theoretical
perspective allows Vrijburg to pinpoint the funda-
mental problems that company taxation raises for
economists. He draws a complicated picture in which
the positive or negative welfare effect of company
taxation strongly depends on the assumptions of the
presumed model. This leads Vrijburg to subscribe to
the wide held opinion in economics that corporate
taxation should be designed as a subcategory of indi-
vidual capital income taxation. That means he recom-
mends policy makers to rely as much as possible on
individual income taxation and to avoid company tax-
ation to the extent possible, in order to prevent
unforeseen negative effects of company taxation.
3. In his contribution, De Wilde (Erasmus University
Rotterdam) asks himself the question whether the
European Commission’s proposal for a Council
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB) leading to an integration of the com-
pany taxes of the EU Member States is a solution to
tax competition within the EU. After having analysed
the EC’s proposal, he concludes that this proposal
also provides incentives for multinationals to pursue
artificial tax base-shifting practices within the EU,
potentially invigorating the risk of undue governmen-
tal tax competition responses (referring to it as a ‘race
to the bottom 2.0’). Therefore, he suggests assessing
alternatives to the sharing mechanism as proposed by
the EC. As an alternative sharing mechanism, he
favours using a quantitative ‘factor presence test’ to
attribute the tax base to EU Member States.
4. Finally, Sting (Erasmus University Rotterdam) dis-
cusses the main legal obstacles the EU treaties pose
for integrating company taxes within the EU. The
main problem she identified is the unanimity require-
ment. To overcome this problem, she considers trea-
ty change, enhanced cooperation, soft law approaches
and also indirect harmonisation through the new sys-
tem of economic governance. Eventually, a possible
non-EU option is considered. However, she recom-
mends making use of the current EU law framework,
such as soft law approaches and the system of the
new economic governance to achieve a more subtle
and less intrusive company tax integration, or instead
a treaty change that would legitimately enhance and
further economic integration in the field of taxation.
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